Interpreting the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994: The Justice Department Versus the Telecommunications Industry & (and) Privacy Rights Advocates by Senseney, Hildegarde A.
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 20 | Number 3 Article 6
1-1-1998
Interpreting the Communications Assistance for
Law Enforcement Act of 1994: The Justice
Department Versus the Telecommunications
Industry & (and) Privacy Rights Advocates
Hildegarde A. Senseney
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hildegarde A. Senseney, Interpreting the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994: The Justice Department Versus the
Telecommunications Industry & (and) Privacy Rights Advocates, 20 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 665 (1998).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol20/iss3/6
Interpreting the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of
1994: The Justice Department Versus the
Telecommunications Industry & Privacy
Rights Advocates
by
HILDEGARDE A. SENSENEY*
I. H istorical Background ............................................................. 669
II. The Communications Assistance For Law
Enforcement Act Of 1994: An Overview .............................. 671
A . T he L aw ............................................................................... 671
1. Who Is Covered by CALEA? ..................................... 672
2. In What Ways Are Telecommunications
Carriers Required to Render Assistance? .................  673
a. What Is "Call-Identifying" Information"? ...........  674
3. Who Pays for All of This9 ............................................ 675
4. How Will CALEA be Enforced? ...............................  676
5. Technological Standards .............................................. 676
a. Initial N otice ............................................................ 678
b. Second N otice .......................................................... 679
c. Final N otice .............................................................. 680
III. What CALEA Attempts to Remedy ..................................... 682
A. The Shortcomings of the 1968 Act and
the ECPA in Forcing Telecommunications
Carriers to Comply .......................... 682
B. What the 1994 Law Attempts to Overcome ................... 682
IV. Conflicts in the Interpretation of CALEA ............................ 684
A. Concerns for Privacy Rights ............................................. 684
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 1998; B.B.A., 1983,
B.S., 1987 University of Texas, Austin. The author wishes to thank her husband for his
love, forbearance, and support, lo these three long years, and also wishes to thank the
Executive Board of COMM/ENT and all of its members for putting up with her.
1. Eavesdropping on Persons Not
Subject to a Warrant ..................................................... 684
2. Expansion of What Is Included in
"Call-Identifying Information" ................... 685
a. The Heightened Protections of
Communications Content ....................................... 686
b. The Lessened Protections of
Transactional Information ..................................... 686
3. Real-Time Tracking of Subjects ................................ 687
B. Who Bears the Responsibility for Costs? ............. . . .. . . .. . . .  690
C. Technological Standards ...................... 693
1. The Conflict Over the Requirements of
the Initial N otice ........................................................... 693
2. The Conflict Over the Requirements
of the Second Notice .................................................... 695
3. The Conflict Over the Requirements
of the Final Notice ........................................................ 696
V . Proposal ................................................................................... 696
V I. C onclusion ................ 68................................................................
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [VOL. 20:665
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT V. TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
Introduction
In the winter of early 1997, as storms whipped across the nation, a
woman was stranded in her car in a blinding snow blizzard. Trapped
for nearly forty hours, her only contact with rescuers was through her
cellular phone.' When the woman called for help on her phone, rescue
workers were unable to find her because of poor visibility.2
The rescuers worked to find which of the four cell-phone towers
in the 40-mile area around the woman's route home was picking up
the loudest signals. Engineers at a telecommunications provider in the
area were able to find the woman by comparing signals from her
phone with those of phones in rescue vehicles.' The capability to
rescue stranded motorists using the advanced technologies of digital
communications is a graphic example of what can be done not only to
help, but also to monitor American citizens.
Since the advent of wireless telephone communications,
technology has advanced at such a rapid pace that now 28,000 new
subscribers sign up every day.4 The telecommunications industry has
suggested that digital technology will make cellular phones so
"inexpensive to use that half the people in the country will carry them
by the year 2000."1
This telecommunications revolution has made just as deep an
impact on illegitimate business interests as it has on legitimate ones.
The fast, efficient, and virtually anonymous means of communications
afforded by cell phones has attracted the patronage of "drug cartels,
money launderers and street gangs."6 Furthermore, law enforcement
agencies feared that cooperation from the telecommunications
industry would decrease as the phone monopolies grew less and less
preeminent.7 '
1. Stranded S.D. Woman Prayed Some, Cried Some; Rescuers Found Her Truck After
40 Hours in Blizzard Using Cellular Phone Signal, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 12, 1997, at 3A.
2. Answering a Call to Help, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 20, 1997, at IA.
3. Id.
4. Albert Gidari, Locating Criminals by the Book, 13 CELLULAR BUS., June 1996, at
70.
5. Big Break For Cellular Phone Firms/FCC Opens More Airwaves for Wireless
Technology, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 24, 1993, at Al.
6. Id.
7. Bill Frezza, Plugging In; We Should Revoke the FBI's License to Snoop, COMM.
WK., Oct. 14, 1996, at 81. Since 1984, when AT&T was divested, the number of long
distance carriers has grown from 1 to over 300. With the advent of wireless technologies,
the number of service providers grew again with the addition of over 160 cellular
providers. Police Access to Advanced Communications Systems: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Technology and Law and Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Senate Joint
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Responding to this progress in technology, and to the calls for
action from the law enforcement community, Congress enacted what
began as the Clinton Administration's Digital Telephony and
Communications Privacy Improvement Act of 1994.8 The bill, now
officially known as the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act ("CALEA"), 9 became the law on October 25, 1994,
when President Clinton signed it.10 CALEA "make[s] clear a
telecommunications carrier's duty to cooperate in the interception of
communications for law enforcement purposes, and for other
purposes." 11
The FBI maintained that changes proposed by CALEA were
necessary to allow law enforcement to be able to maintain
eavesdropping capabilities provided in the 1968 Wiretap Act.' 2 The
FBI promoted CALEA as a "critical tool . . . to fight terrorism,
drug-trafficking cartels, organized and violent crime, and other
life-threatening felonies. "13
Conflict has arisen over CALEA in terms of the expected costs,
both to individuals and to the telecommunications industry. Private
citizens may lose some of their current Fourth Amendment
protections against unreasonable search and seizure. The
telecommunications industry will have to foot the bill after 1998 to
update equipment and machinery to accommodate law enforcement's
expanded eavesdropping requirements. This Note explores the issues
that have arisen since the Justice Department and the FBI began
proposing plans to interpret CALEA in line with its needs.
Judiciary Comm., 103rd Cong. (Mar. 18, 1994) (statement by Louis J. Freeh, Director of
the FBI) available in Fed. Doc. Clearing House, 1994 WL 223962 [hereinafter March
Hearing].
8. Police Access to Advanced Communications Systems: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Technology and Law and Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Senate Joint
Judiciary Comm., 103rd Cong. (statement by Jerry Berman, Executive Director of the
Electronic Frontier Foundation) (Mar. 18, 1997), available in Fed. Doc. Clearing House,
1994 WL 223996.
9. 140 CONG. REC. H10773-02 (Oct. 4, 1994).
10. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 47
U.S.C. §§ 1001-10 (West Supp. 1995)).
11. Id. at preamble.
12. 140 CONG. REC. H10773-02, H10780 (Oct. 4, 1994) (statement of Rep. Markey).
13. Id. at H10783 (letter from Mr. Freeh, Director of the FBI, to Mr. Oxley, read into
the record).
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I
Historical Background
In 1928, the Supreme Court first addressed government
wiretapping in Olmstead v. United States.14 The Court held that
tapping telephone wires outside of the defendant's home and using the
intercepted messages as evidence was not an unreasonable search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The Court found no intrusion
onto constitutionally protected areas and no seizure of anything
tangible. I" Congress reacted to the decision in Olmstead by passing the
Communications Act of 1934, which provided in part that "no person
not being authorized by the sender shall intercept
any ... communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted
communication to any person."16
The Supreme Court overruled Olmstead in 1967 in its ruling in
Katz v. United States when it held that evidence obtained from a
listening device placed in a telephone booth was inadmissible.17 The
Court held that the Fourth Amendment protects people, and not
places.18 The government's unauthorized wiretapping activities
violated the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy in using the
telephone booth and constituted a "search and seizure" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 19
This new interpretation on the power of police to gather evidence
led Congress in the following year to enact Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (the "1968 Act"). 20 The
1968 Act mandated that law enforcement officers follow certain
judicial procedures when conducting electronic surveillance. 21 Under
the 1968 Act, conducting nonconsensual electronic surveillance is
unlawful, with some enumerated exceptions. 22
14. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
15. Id. at 464-66.
16. Pub. L. No. 73-415,48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1996)).
17. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
18. Id. at 351.
19. Id. at 353.
20. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1367,
2232, 2510-2522, 2701-2711, 3121-3127 (1996)).
21. Id.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) provides an exception to preserve national security,
§ 2511(2)(c-d) provides an exception for consensual private or government eavesdropping,
and § 2511(2)(a-b) provides an exception for interceptions by communications carriers
under certain circumstances.
19981
Congress later amended the 1968 Act when it passed the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (the "ECPA") in
order to deal with the advent of improvements in telecommunications
technology.2 3 The ECPA "update[d] and clarif[ied] Federal privacy
protections and standards in light of dramatic changes in new
computer and telecommunications technologies. '" 24
Congress intended the ECPA to address progress in the
telecommunications industry, but it failed to address the most
troublesome shortcomings of the 1968 Act. Specifically, the ECPA
failed to make any provisions to keep pace with technological
advances to prevent the efforts of Congress from becoming obsolete
every few years.25 According to its critics, Congress could have easily
dealt with the subsequent increase in wireless data networks by
including an "expansion clause" that would allow the law to
encompass those "technologies which accomplish the same or similar
tasks as those accomplished by covered technology. '" 26
Senator Leahy, one of the eventual sponsors of the Digital
Telephony Bill, assembled a task force in 1990 to study the problems
inherent in the ECPA.27 The group's final report, made in May 1991,
recommended, inter alia, "that the legal protections of ECPA be
extended to cover new wireless data communications, such as those
occurring over cellular laptop computers and wireless local area
networks (LANs), and cordless phones." 28 The task force wanted to
ensure that the telecommunications industry would not be hindered
by its obligations to accommodate law enforcement in its development
and deployment of new services and technologies.29 The proposed
amendments Leahy suggested sought to balance three policies: (1) to
maintain a narrow focus on law enforcement's abilities to conduct
properly authorized surveillance; (2) to protect individual privacy
despite more sophisticated information gathering technologies; and
(3) to prevent hindering progress in the development of new
telecommunications technology and services. 30
23. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1849-1853 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522
(1996)).
24. S. REP. No. 541 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555.
25. Russell S. Burnside, The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986: The
Challenge of Applying Ambiguous Statutory Language to Intricate Telecommunication
Technologies, 13 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 451, 516 (1987).
26. Id.
27. H.R. REP. No. 827(I) (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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Following this report, in order to redress law enforcement's lack
of ability to keep pace with expanding technologies, the Justice
Departmeni proposed legislation in 1992 that would increase
regulatory control of the telecommunications industry.3 On October
25, 1994, after several revisions and after intense lobbying by FBI
Director Louis Freeh, President Clinton signed the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 into law.32
II
The Communications Assistance For Law Enforcement Act Of
1994: An Overview
The intent behind the Digital Telephony Bill was to require that
telecommunications carriers ensure that new technology not prevent
law enforcement from accessing communications made by subscribers,
pursuant to proper court authorization. The bill would preserve law
enforcement's ability to intercept transmissions via advanced
technologies, such as digital or wireless communications. 33 The final
version of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
of 1994 very closely resembled the legislation proposed by both the
Justice Department and the Clinton Administration.
A. The Law
The primary purpose of the new law was to "clarify a
telecommunications carrier's duty to assist law enforcement agencies
with the lawful interception of communications and the acquisition of
call-identifying information in an ever-changing telecommunications
environment."34 To make sure law enforcement could maintain their
surveillance capabilities in view of these rapidly advancing
technologies, CALEA provides that telecommunications carriers must
31. Jaleen Nelson, Sledge Hammers and Scalpels: The FBI Digital Wiretap Bill and its
Effect on Free Flow of Information and Privacy, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1139, 1141-42 (1994).
32. 140 CONG. REC. H10773-02, H10783 (Oct. 4, 1994) (letter from Mr. Freeh,
director of the FBI, to Mr. Oxley, read into the record). Director Freeh wrote in his letter
to Mr. Oxley that:
[plassage of this legislation is extremely critical, since without it effective law
enforcement, the public safety, and national security will be put at unacceptable
risk. Failure to enact it will rob law enforcement officers of a critical tool they use
to fight terrorism, drug-trafficking cartels, organized and violent crime, and other
life-threatening felonies.
Id.
33. H.R. REP. NO. 827(I) (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489.
34. Implementation of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act,
Initial Notice and Request for Comments, Notices, 60 Fed. Reg. 53,643 (1996).
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meet the assistance capability requirements set forth therein.35 Key
provisions purport to explain who is covered by CALEA, what is
required of them to meet the goals of CALEA, and how CALEA will
be enforced.
1. Who Is Covered by CALEA?
CALEA stipulates that it applies to "telecommunications
carriers" 36 who are defined as: persons or entities that transmit or
switch wire or electronic communications as commercial common
carriers; which includes those who provide commercial mobile
service 37 and those who provide services to such an extent that they
replace a considerable portion of the local phone service.
35. It is interesting to note that since President Clinton took office, federal electronic
surveillance has grown at a rapid rate. In 1992, the last year of the Bush Administration,
there were 340 federal wiretaps. In 1995, there were 672, and the rate is rising quickly.
1995 was the first year that "federal courts approved more wiretaps than all state courts
combined." Jim McGee, Wiretapping Rises Sharply Under Clinton; Drug War Budget
Increases Lead to Continuing Growth of High-Tech Surveillance, WASH. POST, July 7, 1996,
at Al.
36. Pursuant to Pub. L. No. 103-414, § 102(8) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 1001(8) (1995)):
The term 'telecommunications carrier'-
(A) means a person or entity engaged in the transmission or switching of wire or
electronic communications as a common carrier for hire; and (B) includes-(i) a
person or entity engaged in providing commercial mobile service (as defined in
section 332(d) of this title); or (ii) a person or entity engaged in providing wire or
electronic communication switching or transmission service to the extent that the
Commission finds that such service is a replacement for a substantial portion of
the local telephone exchange service and that it is in the public interest to deem
such a person or entity to be a telecommunications carrier for purposes of this
subchapter; but
(C) does not include-(i) persons or entities insofar as they are engaged in
providing information services; and (ii) any class or category of
telecommunications carriers that the Commission exempts by rule after
consultation with the Attorney General.
37. As defined in section 332(d) of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.
§ 332(d), which provides in pertinent part:
(1) the term "commercial mobile service" means any mobile service (as defined
in section 153 of this title) that is provided for profit and makes interconnected
service available (A) to the public or (B) to such classes of eligible users as to be
effectively available to a substantial portion of the public, as specified by
regulation by the Commission; (2) the term "interconnected service" means
service that is interconnected with the public switched network (as such terms are
defined by regulation by the Commission) ... and (3) the term "private mobile
service" means any mobile service (as defined in section 153 of this title) that is
not a commercial mobile service or the functional equivalent of a commercial
mobile service, as specified by regulation by the Commission.
47 U.S.C § 153 provides that the:
term 'mobile service' means a radio communication service carried on between
mobile stations or receivers and land stations, and by mobile stations
[VOL. 20:665HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
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2. In What Ways Are Telecommunications Carriers Required to Render
Assistance?
CALEA spells out what capability requirements are expected of
telecommunications carriers. Generally, pursuant to a court order,
they must ensure that their facilities, equipment, and services are
capable of enabling the government to effectively intercept
communications within the carrier's service area, to or from 'its
equipment, concurrently with the transmission.3 Telecommunications
carriers must be able to "expeditiously and simultaneously" execute
all court orders directed to them.39 The carriers are to facilitate law
enforcement, even to the exclusion of all other communications.4 °
They are also required to quickly provide law enforcement officials
with access to "call-identifying information" that is "reasonably
available" to the carrier, "before, during, or immediately after" the
call.
4 1
communicating among themselves, and includes (A) both one-way and two-way
radio communication services, (B) a mobile service which provides a regularly
interacting group of base, mobile, portable, and associated control and relay
stations (whether licensed on an individual, cooperative, or multiple basis) for
private one-way or two-way land mobile radio communications by eligible users
over designated areas of operation, and (C) any service for which a license is
required in a personal communications service established pursuant to the
proceeding entitled 'Amendment to the Commission's Rules to Establish New
Personal Communications Services.'
47 U.S.C. § 153. Furthermore, section 153 defines a mobile station as "a
radio-communication station capable of being moved and which ordinarily does move." Id.
38. Pub. Law 103-414 § 103 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(1) (1995))
spells out capability requirements as follows:
Except as provided in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section and sections
1007(a) and 1008(b) and (d) of this title, a telecommunications carrier shall
ensure that its equipment, facilities, or services that provide a customer or
subscriber with the ability to originate, terminate, or direct communications are
capable of-1) expeditiously isolating and enabling the government, pursuant to
a court order or other lawful authorization, to intercept, to the exclusion of any
other communications, all wire and electronic communications carried by the
carrier within a service area to or from equipment, facilities, or services of a
subscriber of such carrier concurrently with their transmission to or from the
subscriber's equipment, facility, or service, or at such later time as may be
acceptable to the government.
39. March Hearing, supra note 7 (statement by FBI Director Freeh).
40. Pub. Law 103-414 § 103 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(1) (1995)).
41. 47 U.S.C. at § 1002(a)(2) (1995). The carrier shall be capable of:
expeditiously isolating and enabling the government, pursuant to a court order or
other lawful authorization, to access call-identifying information that is
reasonably available to the carrier-(A) before, during, or immediately after the
transmission of a wire or electronic communication (or at such later time as may
be acceptable to the government); and (B) in a manner that allows it to be
associated with the communication to which it pertains ....
1998]
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a. What Is "Call-Identifying Information"?
The definition and restrictions on what is included in "call-
identifying information" has been subject to much debate, because the
term is not clearly defined in CALEA. In response to the concerns of
privacy advocates, Mr. Freeh, the Director of the FBI, allowed that
the "proposed legislation explicitly states that [it] does not enlarge or
reduce the government's authority to lawfully intercept the content of
communications" 42 and that the FBI's design was not to use cellular
phones as tracking devices; and this prohibition on including
information regarding the physical location of a subscriber was
specifically excluded from CALEA.43 This exclusion will not apply if
the location of the subscriber can be determined from the phone
number, as this was a capability law enforcement had with older
stationary telephones.
This designation was not intended to provide the general
locations of a customer, beyond area code or exchange of the service,
nor was it intended to enable law enforcement officers to track an
individual via his mobile communications unit."
According to the FBI, "call-identifying" information is limited to
such information as dialing type information derived from a pen
register or trap devices, 45 and includes such information as "origin,
duration, and destination [of a call], [and] the telephone number or
Id.
42. March Hearing, supra note 7 (statement by FBI Director Freeh).
43. Pub. Law 103-414, § 103 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B)
(1995)). This section of the act provides:
except that, with regard to information acquired solely pursuant to the authority
for pen registers and trap and trace devices .... such call-identifying information
shall not include any information that may disclose the physical location of the
subscriber (except to the extent that the location may be determined from the
telephone number).
Id.
44. Id.
45. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) defines the term "pen register" as a "device which records or
decodes electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise
transmitted on the telephone line to which such device is attached, but such term does not
include any device used by a provider or customer of a wire or electronic communication
service for billing, or recording as an incident to billing, for communications services
provided by such provider or any device used by a provider or customer of a wire
communication service for cost accounting or other like purposes in the ordinary course of
its business." The statute defines a "trap and trace device" as "a device which captures the
incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number of an
instrument or device from which a wire or electronic communication was transmitted." 18
U.S.C. §§ 3127(3), (4) (1994).
[VOL. 20:665
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similar communication address." 46 Information gained by these means
is only allowed pursuant to a court order that lasts for 60 days and can
be renewed with judicial approval.47 As set forth by Director Freeh in
his testimony before the Joint Judiciary Committee, "call-identifying
information" is limited to the dialing information inherent in any
communication that identifies the origin and destination of a
communication obtained by using a pen-register or trap and trace
device.48 The FBI maintained that there simply was nothing in the new
law that enabled law enforcement to acquire new information that is
not now already available to it.49
Although the FBI conceded that some cellular carriers do
"acquire information relating to the general location of a cellular
telephone for call distribution analysis purposes," this information was
not the same type of information as used in "true" tracking devices,
and even this generalized location information would be subject to a
court order.50
3. Who Pays for All of This?
Congress debated the issue of who would foot the bill to bring the
telecommunications industry into compliance with CALEA.51
CALEA authorizes $500 million to be set aside to carry out upgrades
and modifications for fiscal years 1995 through 1998. This money is
designated to remain available until it is expended.52 The affected
46. March Hearing, supra note 7 (statement by FBI Director Freeh).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. Freeh cites to United States v. Karo as a case that involved a "true tracking"
device. There the Court held that a law enforcement agency could not follow the signal
from a beeper it had planted in a shipment of ether into the defendant's home without a
warrant. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). "Indiscriminate monitoring of property that has been
withdrawn from public view would present far too serious a threat to privacy interests in
the home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight." 468 U.S. at 716.
What was noteworthy in this case was that there the government invaded the privacy of the
defendant's home, something that would not always occur when the government monitors
a suspect's movements with his cell phone.
51. 140 CONG. REC. H10773-02 (Oct. 4, 1994).
52. The Act provides that the Attorney General has discretion to reimburse costs to
telecommunications carriers for "all reasonable costs directly associated" with any changes
made to equipment, facilities, or services installed on or before January 1, 1995 to come
into compliance with the Act. The Federal Communications Commission determines, on
petition, whether a telecommunications carrier will be reimbursed for changes made after
January 1, 1995. See 47 U.S.C. § 1008 (1997). At the outset, $500 million was authorized to
be appropriated for fiscal years 1995 to 1998 to reimburse the telecommunications industry
for the mandated compliance. 47 U.S.C. § 1009 (1997).
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industries have expressed concern that the $500 million allocated by
CALEA to reimburse telecommunications companies for their start-
up costs would be insufficient.53 For this reason CALEA contains a
"grandfather" provision, stating that, in the event that a
telecommunications carrier has requested payment for modifications,
and the Attorney General has refused to reimburse the carrier for all
reasonable costs, the carrier shall be deemed to be in compliance until
the existing equipment, facilities or service are "replaced or
significantly upgraded or otherwise undergoes major modification. '" 54
Yet, after the initial four year period is over, the government will no
longer reimburse carriers for modifications; the telecommunications
industry is then expected to bear the "reasonable costs of
compliance." 55
4. How Will CALEA Be Enforced?
In order to enforce the provisions of CALEA, a court issuing an
order against a telecommunications carrier can impose a fine of up to
$10,000 per day for failure to comply with CALEA 56 A court can
issue such an order only if it finds that the law enforcement officer or
agency has no readily available alternatives, such as another carrier, to
implement the interception; and compliance with CALEA would have
been feasible on the part of the offending telecommunications
carrier.57 Further, the court can require that the offending
telecommunications carrier institute the modifications to bring it into
compliance with CALEA, so long as the directed modifications do not
cause the telecommunications carrier to incur unreasonable costs that
will not be reimbursed by the Attorney General.5"
5. Technological Standards
CALEA did not specify what technological standards would be
applied to the telecommunications industry to ensure compliance with
its provisions. 59 Instead, it provides that in order to ensure that
CALEA is efficiently adopted throughout the industry, the Attorney
General and other law enforcement agencies will consult with
''appropriate associations and standard-setting organizations of the
53. 140 CONG. REC. H10773, H10780 (Oct. 4, 1994) (statement of Mr. Hyde).
54. 47 U.S.C. § 1008 (1997).
55. 140 CONG. REC. H10773, H10782 (Oct. 4, 1994) (statement of Mr. Edwards).
56. Pub. L. No. 103-414, § 201 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2522 (1995)).
57. Pub. L. No. 103-414, § 108 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 1007 (1995)).
58. Id.
59. 47 U.S.C. § 1006 (1997).
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telecommunications industry, with representatives of users of
telecommunications equipment, facilities, and services, and with State
utility commissions."" CALEA further states that, should the
industry groups fail to issue the required technical standards, or, if a
government agency or "any other person" finds the standards the
industry has issued to be deficient, the agency or that person can
petition the Federal Communications Commission to step. in and
establish rules that will satisfy Section 103 of CALEA.61 However, the
absence of standards will not relieve a telecommunications carrier
from deploying a technology, or meeting its obligations under
CALEA.62
The Attorney General is obliged, within one year after the
enactment date of CALEA, (after consulting with law enforcement
agencies and telecommunications providers, and after publishing
notice and comment), to publish in the Federal Register notice of the
actual number ("actual capacity" 63) of communication interceptions it
projects it will conduct after four years, as well as notice of the
maximum capacity64 required to make the estimated number of
interceptions. 65 All telecommunications carriers must be ready to
comply with the figures set out in these notices within three years of
60. 47 U.S.C. § 1006(a)(1) (1997).
61. 47 U.S.C. § 1006(b)(1) (1997).
62. 47 U.S.C. § 1006(a)(3) (1997).
63. Actual capacity is defined as: "The actual number of communication
interceptions, pen registers, and trap and trace devices, representing a portion of the
maximum capacity, that the Attorney General estimates that government agencies
authorized to conduct electronic surveillance may conduct and use simultaneously" by
October 25, 1998. Implementation of Section 104 of the Communications Assistance for
Law Enforcement Act, Second Notice and Request for Comments, 62 Fed. Reg. 1,902 (Jan.
17, 1997).
64. Maximum capacity is defined as: "[tihe maximum capacity required to
accommodate all of the communication interceptions, pen registers, and trap and trace
devices that the Attorney General estimates that government agencies authorized to
conduct electronic surveillance may conduct and use simultaneously" by October 25, 1998.
Id.
65. In general, within one year of the enactment date, after consulting with law
enforcement agencies, and industry representatives, and after notice and comment, the
Attorney General is to publish in the Federal Register "(A) notice of the actual number of
communication interceptions, pen registers, and trap and trace devices, representing a
portion of the maximum capacity set forth under subparagraph (B), that the Attorney
General estimates that government agencies authorized to conduct electronic surveillance
may conduct and use simultaneously" by October 25, 1998; and "(B) notice of the
maximum capacity required to accommodate all of the communication interceptions, pen
registers, and trap and trace devices that the Attorney General estimates that government
agencies authorized to conduct electronic surveillance may conduct and use
simultaneously" after October 25, 1998. 47 U.S.C. § 1003(a)(1) (1997).
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publication of the Final Notice, or by October 25, 1998, whichever is
longer.66 The Initial Notice with requests for comments was published
on October 16, 1996.67
a. Initial Notice
The capacity figures set forth by the FBI 68 in the Initial Notice
were "derived as a result of a thorough analysis of electronic
surveillance needs" after working with law enforcement agencies,
telecommunications industry representatives, and courts around the
country to establish a baseline level.69 This baseline level was
determined by analyzing "location and occurrence" of reported
electronic surveillance. 70 The levels were then adjusted on the basis of
geographic variations. 71 Based on this, the FBI separated actual and
maximum capacity requirements into three categories, based on
geographic area, demographics, and other factors.72 Categories I and
II represent areas with high historical levels of electronic surveillance.
Category I only includes the few most densely populated areas with
the highest histories of such surveillance. 73 Category III represents all
other geographic areas.74 The requirements, as proposed by the FBI,
are as follows:75
Actual Capacity Max. Capacity
Category I 0.5% 1%
Category 11 0.25% 0.5%
Category III 0.05% 0.25%
66. Implementation of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act,
Initial Notice and Request for Comments, 60 Fed. Reg. 53,643, 53,644 (Oct. 16, 1996).
67. Id. at 53,643.
68. The Attorney General delegated responsibilities for the Act to the FBI.
Implementation of Section 104 of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act, Second Notice and Request for Comments, 62 Fed. Reg. 1,902 (Jan. 17, 1997).
69. Initial Notice and Request for Comments, 60 Fed. Reg. at 53,644.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Initial Notice and Request for Comments, 60 Fed. Reg. at 53,644.
75. Id The percentages are expressed as a percentage of "engineered capacity,"
which the notice defines as "the maximum number of subscribers that can be served
[simultaneously] by that equipment, facility, or service." Initial Notice and Request for
Comments, 60 Fed. Reg. at 53,645.
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b. Second Notice
The Second Notice and Request for Comments was not published
by the FBI until January 14, 1997.76 After consulting with privacy
advocates, telecommunications carriers, and other interested parties
after the issuance of the Initial Notice, the FBI determined that a
Second Notice was needed to "refine its original approach. 7 7 The
Second Notice generally explained how figures for actual capacity and
maximum capacity would be derived. For instance, in response to
comments after the Initial Notice, the FBI decided that the geographic
area used in determining what category applied to an area would be
different for "wireless" and "wireline" 78 carriers. "Wireline" carriers'
geographic areas were fixed as county borders, whereas the
geographic areas used for "wireless" carriers, because of the greater
mobility of the wireless subscriber, were designated as "Metropolitan
Statistical Areas," "Rural Service Areas," "Major Trading Areas," or
"Basic Trading Areas." 79
The Second Notice also responded to comments on the Initial
Notice by creating new formulas for determining actual and maximum
capacity that consider whether the telecommunications carrier
operates a wireless or wireline service, and expected growth factors.80
Growth factors under this analysis were determined using
historical interception activity information and applying statistical and
analytical methods to derive projected future numerical levels.8'
76. Implementation of Section 104 of the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act, Second Notice and Request for Comments, 62 Fed. Reg. 1,902 (Jan. 17,
1997).
77. Id. at 1,903-04.
78. "Wireline" carriers were designated as those that offer local exchange services.
"Wireless" carriers were designated as those that offer "certain commercial mobile radio
services, specifically cellular service and personal communications service." Id. at 1,904.
79. Second Notice and Request for Comments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 1,905.
80. Id. at 1,906. The formulas are:
Wireline: FACR in a county = (HIA in a county) x (A-wireline).
FMCR in a county = (FACR in a county) x (M-wireline).
Wireless: FACR in a MSA = (HIA in MSA) x (A-wireless).
FMCR in a MSA = (FACR in a MSA) x (M-wireless).
FACR = Future Actual Capacity Requirement,
HIA = Historical Interception Activity,
FMCR = Future Maximum Capacity Requirement,
MSA = Market Service Area
A-wireline, M-wireline, A-wireless, and M-wireless represent growth factors.
Id.
81. Second Notice and Request for Comments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 1,906.
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These factors were set out by county and Market Service Area by the
FBI and included in the appendices of the Second Notice. 2
In establishing these new formulas, the FBI agreed to do away
with the categories it had set out in the Initial Notice. 3 This was
because it had received a number of comments complaining that the
categories did not clarify what geographic regions fell into each one.84
The new formulas were also intended to minimize the cost impact on
small companies in areas with minimal to no history of electronic
surveillance by tying minimum capacity to past history, with a
minimum threshold capacity for those areas that have no past history
of electronic surveillance. 85
c. Final Notice
The FBI published its nearly 100-page Final Notice of Capacity
on March 12, 1998.86 For cellular providers, the capacity requirements
are broken down into -"estimated actual and maximum interception
needs." 7 The needs by city and county are based on "historic
interception activity with future capacity projections based on growth
factor analyses which draw upon past levels of lawfully authorized
interception orders."88 For instance, Los Angeles' projected needs for
cellular providers are set out as follows: 103 estimated actual
interceptions that may be conducted per day; 167 estimated maximum
interceptions that may be conducted per day; and a historical
experience in Los Angeles of 60 interceptions per day.89
The Final Notice gathered information on cellular interceptions
during a survey period (January 1, 1993 to March 1, 1995) as its
historical baseline in its calculations of capacity requirements, using
the single day with the most interceptions as the actual historical
baseline. 90 These baseline figures are then translated into estimated
82. Appendices are available in the FBI reading room located at FBI Headquarters,
in Washington, D.C. Id. at 1,907.
83. Id. at 1,909.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1,911.
86. Implementation of Section 104 of the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act, Final Notice of Capacity, 63 Fed. Reg. 12,218 (Mar. 12,1998).
87. Id. at 12,230.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 12,237. The figures represent "historical interceptions and an estimation of
the simultaneous requirement of pen register, trap and trace, and call content interceptions
that may be conducted anywhere within an MSA/RSA [Metropolitan Statistical
Area/Rural Statistical Area]."
90. Id. at '12,226.
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actual interceptions and estimated maximum interceptions needed be
the application of growth factors. These growth factors are derived
from a formula based on the historical interception activity of a given
market service area, and its market projections for wireless growth.9'
The Final Notice makes clear that the:
obligation to satisfy the capacity requirements.., is the
responsibility of all carriers that operate within a given geographic
91. Id. at 12,2206. The formulas are:
Wireline: FACR in a county = (HIA in a county) x (Asubwireline).
FMCR in a county = (FACR in a county) x (Msubwireline).
Wireless: FACR in a MSA = (HIA in MSA) x (Asubwireless).
FMCR in a MSA = (FACR in a MSA) x (Msubwireless).
FACR = Future Actual Capacity Requirement;
HIA = Historical Interception Activity,
FMCR = Future Maximum Capacity Requirement,
MSA = Market Service Area
A-subwireline, M-subwireline, A-subwireless, and M-subwireless represent
growth factors.
The Final Notice explains the difference between the growth factors as set out in the
Second Notice and those in the Final Notice as follows:
A commonly-used analytical tool for projections, known as Best-Fit-Line
analysis, was used to track the number of court orders over time and then to
project the number into the future. Projections were made for call content court
orders for wireline and wireless for the year 1998 and the year 2004. Projections
were also made for the vastly greater number of pen register and trap and trace
court orders for wireline and wireless for the year 1998 and the year 2004.
Composite growth figures for wireline interceptions and for wireless interceptions
were then calculated by weighting the court order projections by the relative
number of call content interceptions and interceptions of call-identifying
information during the period surveyed. The resulting A subwireline and A
subwireless growth factors were based on the 1998 projections. The M subwireline
and M subwireless growth factors were based on the 2004 projections. The year
1998 was selected to comply with the statutory language of CALEA requiring law
enforcement to estimate actual capacity requirements by that time. The year 2004
was selected because it provided a 10-year period after the passage of CALEA, a
period that was considered reasonable for projecting maximum capacity
requirements. It was also considered to be a rational period for constituting a
stable capacity ceiling and a design guide.
The value derived for A subwireline is 1.259; the value derived for A
subwireless is 1.707; the value derived for M subwireline is 1.303; and the value
derived for M subwireless is 1.621. These growth factors can also be translated
into, and understood in terms of, annual growth rates for capacity requirements.
For wireline, if computed annually, growth rates are 5.92 percent for the period
from 1994 through 1998, and 4.55 percent for the period from 1998 through 2004.
For wireless, if computed annually, growth rates are 14.30 percent and 8.38
percent respectively, for the same time periods. Of relevance in determining the
differences in growth rates are the expectations of overall business growth for
wireline and wireless telephone services. Market projections for wireline show a
steady growth rate of 3.5 percent annually, and wireless annual growth is
projected to be 12.0 percent during each of the next 10 years.
Id. at 12,226-27.
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area. Although law enforcement cannot dictate how carriers should
apply the capacity requirements, law enforcement is providing
guidance to the industry as to the distribution of capacity
requirements within a particular geographic area.
92
III
What CALEA Attempts to Remedy
A. The Shortcomings of the 1968 Act and the ECPA in Forcing
Telecommunications Carriers to Comply
The 1968 Act made wiretaps legal by establishing a judicial
review procedure for law enforcement to follow to obtain court-
ordered wiretaps. 93 However, when Congress enacted the 1968
legislation, it failed to provide any specific means to force the
telecommunications industry to comply with requests for technical or
other assistance to law enforcement.9 4 The Service Provider
Assistance requirement was considered to be "self-evident and
implicit" in the legislation.95 Despite this, a few telecommunications
providers initially refused to provide law enforcement with the
requested assistance, even in light of a court order to do so. 96 Because
of these cases, Congress amended the 1968 Act to expressly assert the
obligations of telecommunications carriers to assist law enforcement.97
Then in 1986, Congress passed the ECPA in response to new
computer and communications technologies. 98 This law was written to
encompass new classes of electronic communications, ranging from
databases to e-mail.99 More recent changes in the telecommunications
and computer fields have required that the law be updated again in
order to keep pace with the rapid rate of change.' °
B. What the 1994 Law Attempts to Overcome
Telecommunications used to be "fixed point." That is, they were
made by a person to "a fixed location corresponding to a specific
92. Id. at 12,230.
93. 140 CONG. REC. H10773, H10780 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (comments of Rep.
Markey).
94. March Hearing, supra note 7 (statement by FBI Director Freeh).
95. Id.
96. Id. See, e.g., Application of United States, 427 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1970).
97. March Hearing, supra note 7 (statement by FBI Director Freeh).
98. 140 CONG. REC. H10773, H10780 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (comments of Rep.
Markey).
99. Id.
100. Id.
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telephone number."101 Historically, when police conducted court-
authorized wiretaps on a telephone, they would be able to intercept
the content of any call, along with the related dialing information
linked to the phone number to which the court order was applied. 2
Traditional copper-wire phone lines could easily be tapped at
telephone switching stations, or any point along the transmission
line. 10 3 However, eavesdropping on cellular conversations by this
method would only give the listener a series of blips, since cellular
technology encodes words at one end of the line, and decodes them at
the other. 1°
4
Digital communications have experienced explosive growth in the
past eight years. "[A]dvances in telecommunications technologies, as
well as the increasing number of common carriers (approximately
2,000) entering the telecommunications marketplace, have introduced
new sophisticated services and features that allow for the efficient
transmission of multiple, simultaneous communications of multiple
subscribers.' 1 5 The FBI's stance on this proliferation of new
technologies has been that these technologies should not be allowed to
effectively repeal provisions of the 1968 Act. 1°6
Advanced services and features, such as cell telephones and call
forwarding, allow communications to be directed away from specific
fixed locations. 7 This mobility greatly reduces law enforcement's
ability to conduct electronic surveillance.108 According to tele-
communications representatives, "existing telecommunications
systems and networks will thwart court authorized intercepts.'
10 9
Research conducted by the FBI indicated that in 1993, due to
technological barriers, law enforcement agencies were prevented from
fully carrying out court-authorized electronic surveillance in 91
instances. 110
101. March Hearing, supra note 7 (statement of FBI Director Freeh).
102. Id.
103. Raymond Smith, Police Phone Taps Not an Everyday, Practical Tool; They Play
Well in Film Scenes, but High Tech is Not Always Cost Effective, PRESS-ENTERPRISE, Mar.
3, 1997, at B1.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 140 CONG. REC. H10773, H10780 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (comments of Rep.
Markey).
107. March Hearing, supra note 7 (statement of FBI Director Freeh).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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Technological advances put severe constraints on law
enforcement's ability to effectively wiretap, but several industry
executives acknowledge that without legislation, their companies
would not be willing to invest "time, money, and technical resources in
developing and implementing solutions, especially if there were no
assurance that their competitors would do so.""' Therefore, in 1992,
after President Bush gave the Justice Department the authority to
begin a legislative initiative, it announced the Digital Telephony
legislation. 12
IV
Conflicts in the Interpretation of CALEA
A. Concerns for Privacy Rights
Privacy rights advocates contend that the FBI is forcing phone
companies to "install equipment in their new digital communications
systems that will 'significantly expand' the nature of electronic
surveillance." '113 Although the industry is obliged under the CALEA
to come up with surveillance standards to meet its goals, the FBI has
been using the standard setting process to make demands on the
industry that the industry has deemed unacceptable. Complaints have
even been issued to Congress that the FBI has threatened to "derail
the standards process and to seek enforcement orders against carriers
if all of its demands as reflected in the ESI are not met.' ' 1 4
1. Eavesdropping on Persons Not Subject to a Warrant
One of the demands the FBI has made is the capability to
continue to eavesdrop on conference calls, even after the person who
is the target of the surveillance has hung up. This, in effect, allows law
enforcement to continue eavesdropping on parties who are not subject
to the warrant.11 5 Privacy rights advocates have noted that the purpose
of the CALEA was to monitor the target, but that the FBI is asking to
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Jim McGee, FBI Calls for Greater Wiretap Capability; Phone Industry Pressed to
Install New Surveillance Equipment, WASH. POST, April 30, 1997, at C13.
114. Hearings Before the House Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Crime, 105th Cong.
(1997) (testimony of Thomas E. Wheeler, President & CEO Cellular Telecommunications
Industry Association) (Oct. 23, 1997), available in Fed. Doc. Clearing House, 1997 WL
14152470.
115. CTIA Asks FCC to Resolve Dispute with FBI on Digital Wiretap Law, COMM.
TODAY, July 17, 1997.
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continue to monitor those still on the line after the target has hung
up.116 Not only is this not mandated by CALEA, but providing this
capability would violate CALEA and the Fourth Amendment, "since
law enforcement is not authorized to intercept the calls of people not
named in the order, when they are not using the facilities named in the
order." 117
2. Expansion of What Is Included in "Call-Identifying Information"
Another of the FBI's demands has been to expand the definition
of "call-identifying information." This is one of the more hotly
debated issues under the CALEA. Contrary to the intent of the
CALEA, the FBI wants to use pen registers to collect digits that the
target dials after the connection is made. These additional digits do
not identify the destination of the call, but are part of the content of
the call."' The FBI also wants online notice when there is a change in
the customer's service, when calls are put on hold, and when the
subject has voice-mail.119
Another concern raised by privacy rights groups was that the
industry is beginning to set up their systems using "packet switching"
protocols like those used in the Internet. 120 This means that the
switching system would break up communications "packets" that
contain the addressing information needed to get the communication
to its destination.' 21 Unfortunately, this standard allows the industry
to deliver the "entire packet data stream" to law enforcement under a
pen register order when that order only entitles law enforcement to
receive dialing or signaling information.122 This proposed standard
then leaves it to law enforcement to sort out the content from the
addressing information, and assumes that law enforcement will ignore
the content.123 Although Congress required the industry to employ
technology that would keep these two separate under CALEA, the
industry and the FBI assumed that would not be feasible to separate
this information in a "packet switching environment." 124
116. Hearings before the House Judiciary Comm., Subcomm.' on Crime, 105th Cong.
(1997) (testimony of James X. Dempsey, Senior Staff Counsel, Center for Democracy and
Technology) (Oct. 23, 1997), available in Fed. Doc. Clearing House, 1997 WL 14152470.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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a. The Heightened Protections of Communications Content
What is important in the discussion of what is considered within
the scope of "call-identifying information," is that such information
does not receive the same level of protection as "content." Actual
contents of communications, or the transmitted conversations
themselves, are protected by laws that prevent their disclosure to
either private persons or law enforcement agencies, except under
court order. 125 The 1968 Act gives high protection status to
communication contents by requiring that law enforcement officials
who are trying to conduct electronic surveillance obtain a court order
that authorizes the interception.126 If the reviewing magistrate finds
that probable cause exists to lead officers to believe that a person who
has or will commit a particular crime will be using a particular
communications device, that the interception will elicit information
regarding the crime, and that such communications will be
intercepted, then the magistrate may issue an order authorizing the
search. 12
7
b. The Lessened Protections of Transactional InformationI 28
Transactional communications attributes that are not content-
based have typically been given far less protection by the courts.
Courts that have followed-the Supreme Court's holding in the Smith v.
Maryland129 case generally have not found that any information other
than communication contents should be accorded the protection of
the Fourth Amendment.130 These courts have held that disclosure of
such transactional information as the time, date, existence and
duration of a communication, and any other information regarding
billing will not be protected under the Fourth Amendment.
131
125. Susan Freiwald, Uncertain Privacy: Communication Attributes After the Digital
Telephony Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 949, 950 (1996).
126. Id. at 968. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1996).
127. Freiwald, supra note 125, at 968.
128. Transactional information is the information that is available to law enforcement
agents through pen registers, trap and trace devices, and telephone billing information.
Such information includes numbers called, "credit card calls, collect calls, operator assisted
calls" and such services as call-forwarding and call-waiting. This information is not subject
to the warrant request, but may be obtained by law enforcement by through a subpoena.
March Hearing, supra note 7 (statement by FBI Director Freeh).
129. 442 U.S. 735, 751 (1979). Applying Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the
Supreme Court held that defendant had no "legitimate expectation of privacy" in the
numbers he dialed, and that therefore the use of a pen register to capture the numbers he
dialed is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
130. Freiwald, supra note 125, at 988.
131. Id.
[VOL. 20:665
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT V. TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
Transactional information available from "telephone billing
records" has become more detailed and more informative over the
past decade. People increasingly rely on their telephones to perform
many business transactions that were previously conducted in person,
such as banking, shopping, and accessing messages; all of which can
give as much personal information as keeping a person under constant
surveillance.'32 Under the CALEA, it is possible for law enforcement
to obtain information from a telecommunications provider's records
regarding a subscriber's name, address, phone toll billing records,
phone numbers, types of service subscribed to and how long the
service has been active, upon presentation of an administrative
subpoena, grand jury or trial subpoena.'33 These subpoenas require
less judicial review than a court order. Moreover, when combined with
pen register and trap and trace information, this information can lead
to information about the people on the other end of the calls made by
a subscriber.134 Finally, since cellular phone billing records often
contain information regarding the cell site, it is possible that the
information may be obtained by law enforcement through a subpoena,
if it is included in the "telephone toll billing records."135
3. Real-Time Tracking of Subjects
The provision in the CALEA that specifically excludes location
information has been termed the "O.J. Simpson Provision," for the
average citizen was unaware that a person could be tracked by
monitoring the cell phone until the now famous chase scene where
police were able to follow Simpson's white Bronco around Los
Angeles.136 While the CALEA does specifically exclude any
information regarding the specific location of the subscriber from the
scope of "call-identifying" information, 137 even the FBI conceded that
some cellular carriers "acquire information relating to the general
location of a cellular telephone for call distribution analysis purposes,"
132. Id. at 995.
133. Pub. L. No. 103-414, § 207 (codified as amended as 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(c)(1)(C))(1995). See also Freiwald, supra note 125, at 995.
134. Freiwald, supra note 125, at 995.
135. Id. at 999.
136. Renee Saunders, Big Brother Is Listening; Electronic Surveillance, 19 SATELLITE
COMM., No. 7, July, 1995, at 18.
137. Except that, with regard to information acquired solely pursuant to the authority
for pen registers and trap and trace devices .... such call-identifying information shall not
include any information that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber (except to
the extent that the location may be determined from the telephone number). Pub. L. No.
103-414, § 103(a)(2)(B) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2)(B)(1995)).
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which would be available to law enforcement agencies, pursuant to a
court order.138
Despite the express prohibition on this kind of surveillance, the
FBI has also insisted that the industry accommodate its desire to track
the location of its subjects. In April of 1996, the FBI set before the
Telecommunications Industry Association ("TIA"), the body the
Justice Department gathered to work with it to implement technical
standards, its own version of the "Electronic Surveillance Interface"
("ESI") 139 wherein the FBI requested "that a 'subject mobility
message' be delivered to law enforcement 'whenever the subject
changes location within or between systems." ' 140
A widely reported story in the New York Times that gave an
account of another meeting between the government and industry
representatives compounded the fears of privacy advocates. 141 This
article reported that the FBI had promulgated a new requirement that
telecommunications carriers provide law enforcement agencies with
"the location of a cellular phone caller within a half-second.' 42
Privacy rights advocates felt that this requirement would give the FBI
"a remote control homing device planted in every car!' 143 The
industry felt that the FBI's new interpretation stretched the
boundaries of the law.144 Specifically, the FBI demanded that wireless
networks be designed to report "1 [w]hen a cellular phone is turned
on (even if no call is made) 2. [w]hen a cellular phone moves within a
service area or moves to another carrier's service area. [and] 3. [w]hen
a cellular phone makes or receives a call.' 45 Furthermore, the FBI
wants this intercepted information delivered to law enforcement
138. March Hearing, supra note 7 (statement by FBI Director Freeh).
139. Center for Democracy and Technology, 2 CDT POLICY POST, No. 2.32 (Sept. 20,
1996) <http://www.cdt.org/publications/pp2.32.html>. (An ESI is the design of the
interface between law enforcement's surveillance equipment and the network used by the
telecommunications industry).
140. Jim McGee, Heightened Tension Over Digital Taps; Telecommunications Industry,
FBI at Odds Over High-Tech Tools, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 1996, at HI.
141. John Markoff, Cellular Industry Rejects U.S. Plan for Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 20, 1996, at Al.
142. Id.
143. Bill Frezza, Plugging In; We Should Revoke the FBI's License to Snoop, COMM.
WK., Oct. 14, 1996, at 81.
144. Markoff, supra note 141, at Al (statement by Thomas E. Wheeler, president of
Cellular Telecommunications Industry, a trade organization).
145. Center for Democracy and Technology, 2 CDT POLICY POST, No. 2.32 (Sept. 20,
1996) < http://www.cdt.org/publications/pp-2.32.html>' See also Frezza, supra note 143, at
81.
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agents within 500 milliseconds, 146 a capacity that industry insiders
maintain is several times faster than some of today's switching
technologies can actually react once numbers are dialed.1 47 The FBI's
new requests were presented in the "Electronic Surveillance
Interface" proposal.1 48 The new demands by the FBI contradict the
provisions of the CALEA and the statements made by Director Freeh
prior to the Senate Joint Judiciary Committee before passage of the
bill.149
The FBI responded to this attack by stating that it was not
attempting to change any of the legal standards that have limited it in
the past.150 Deputy Director of the FBI's New York office, James
Kallstrom, maintained that law enforcement has "always known the
general locations of phones [they] tap" and is not attempting to get
"pinpoint accuracy" in plotting subscribers' locations.' 5' AT&T
Wireless attorneys characterized this statement as a "blatant lie, an
effort to backpedal now that the issue has come to public
attention."152 From indications in statements made by Tim Ayers, a
Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association spokesman, the
FBI may have a difficult time persuading the TIA to go along with its
plan.' 53
146. Center for Democracy and Technology, 2 CDT POLICY POST, No. 2.32 (Sept. 20,
1996) < http://www.edt.orgtpublications/pp.2.32.html>.
147. Hearings Before the House Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Crime, 105th Cong.
(1997) (testimony of Thomas E. Wheeler, President & CEO Cellular Telecommunications
Industry Association) (Oct. 23, 1997), available in Fed. Doc. Clearing House, 1997 WL
14152470.
148. The ESI memo the FBI presented to the telecommunications group has not been
publicly released. Center for Democracy and Technology, 2 CDT POLICY POST, No. 2.32
(Sept. 20, 1996). http://www.cdt.orglpublications/pp-2.32.html. See also Frezza, supra note
143, at 81.
149. Center for Democracy and Technology, 2 CDT POLICY POST, No. 2.32 (Sept. 20,
1996) <http://www.cdt.orgtpublications/pp-2.32.html> (Mr, Freeh stated that the
"proposed legislation explicitly states that [it] does not enlarge or reduce the government's
authority to lawfully intercept the content of communications."). March Hearing, supra
note 7 (statement by FBI Director Freeh).
150. Jube Shiver, Jr., Congressman Urges Inquiry of Wireless Tracking Plan;
Telecommunications: FBI Seeking Technology to Locate Cellular Phone Users, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 1996, at 2.
151. Id.
152. Frezza, supra note 143, at 81.
153. Id. (comments by Tim Ayers that "[tihe issue is not of wiretap, but of turning
phones into homing devices.").
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B. Who Bears the Responsibility for Costs?
On May 10, 1996, the FBI published its Proposed Rule on
Implementation of § 109 of CALEA. 154 The purpose of the Proposed
Rule was to establish the procedures by which the telecommunications
industry could recoup their costs in complying with CALEA15 5 The
FBI estimated that roughly 3,000 telecommunications carriers would
be affected by its rules.156 The Proposed Rule set forth how
telecommunications carriers were to determine reasonable,
disallowed, and allowed costs.1 57 It also detailed how a carrier was to
submit cost estimates and requests for payment from the government
for disbursement of funds allocated under CALEA.l58 Further, it
considered how to protect trade secrets and proprietary information in
enforcing compliance with CALEA.'5 9
After the FBI reviewed comments it received on the Proposed
Rule, it responded to only one set of concerns in its Request for
Comment that asked the industry to come forth with input on the
definition of "significantly upgraded" and "major modifications.' 160 In
response to the Proposed Rule the FBI received comments from 16
telecommunications representatives requesting clarification of the
meaning of these two terms.161 This question affects only those
telecommunications carriers who had upgraded systems before
January 1, 1995 and does not affect capability modifications deemed
not reasonably achievable under CALEA's § 109(b)(2) 162 or capacity
154. Implementation of Section 109 of the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act, Proposed Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,396 (May 10, 1996).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 21,398.
157. See generally Proposed Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,396 (May 10, 1996).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Implementation of Section 109 of the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act: Request for Comment on "Significant Upgrade" and "Major
Modification," Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 61 Fed. Reg. 58,799 (Nov. 19,
1996).
161. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 61 Fed. Reg. at 58,800. Proposed Rule
§ 100.11(a)(1) added to the costs otherwise set forth in 47 U.S.C. § 1008(e) as costs eligible
for reimbursement the following:
All reasonable plant specific costs directly associated with the modifications
performed by carriers in connection with equipment, facilities, and services
installed or deployed on or before January 1, 1995, to establish the capabilities
necessary to comply with [the Act], until the equipment, facility, or service is
replaced or significantly upgraded or otherwise undergoes major modifications.
Proposed Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,400.
162. Providing special consideration if compliance is not reasonably achievable with
respect to equipment, facilities, and services deployed after January 1, 1995. Pub. L. No.
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modifications under § 104(e). 163 The FBI stated that as of November
19, 1996, funds under CALEA were available to begin the
reimbursement effort for carriers not hampered by the definitions in
question.164
CALEA provides that telecommunications carriers shall be
reimbursed for "reasonable costs" incurred in achieving compliance,
and the Proposed Rule provides a definition of reasonable costs.
Under this definition, a cost is reasonable if it "does not exceed that
which would be incurred by a prudent person in the conduct of a
competitive business." 16  The Rule further specifies that no
presumption of reasonableness will be accorded to any costs incurred
by the carrier, and that the carrier shoulders the burden of proof of
justifying any costs as reasonable to the Justice Department. 66
Telecommunications carriers will have to prove their costs should be
reimbursed against the provision in CALEA that states that the
regulations contained therein shall attempt to minimize the costs to
the government. 67 Precisely where the Justice Department will draw
the line on what is reasonable has yet to be tested. As of November
1996, the FBI was still making statements in terms of beginning
reimbursement "as soon as possible."'168
Statements made during Congressional hearings in October 1994
categorically held that although the government could not fund "the
costs of new technology associated with law enforcement wiretapping
needs in perpetuity," the industry should be fairly reimbursed for
"some of their research, development, and start-up costs." 169 After
October 25, 1998, "carriers-and by default their customers-must
pick up the tab for 'reasonable' wiretap requirements as a normal cost
of doing business. Law enforcement will foot the bill only for
increasing network capacity for simultaneous wiretaps."'170
In statements made before the Senate Joint Judiciary Committee
in March 1994, FBI Director Freeh indicated that requiring
103-414, § 109(b)(2) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 1008(b)(2) (1996)).
163. Providing for any capacity modifications made in accordance with § 109(e) Pub. L.
No. 103-414, § 104(e), (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 1003(e) (1996)).
164. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 61 Fed. Reg. 58,799, 58,800 (Nov. 19,
1996).
165. Proposed Rule, § 100.11, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,400.
166. Id.
167. 47 U.S.C. §1008(2)(2).
168. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 61 Fed. Reg. at 58,800.
169. 140 CONG. REC. H10773-02, H10779 (Oct. 4, 1994) (comments of Mr. Brooks).
170. Deborah Eby, The FBI Just Doesn't Get It; Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act, 99 AMERICA'S NETWORK, No. 12, June 15, 1995, at 48.
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telecommunication service providers to "expend additional technical
or monetary resources, even pursuant to court order, to help law
enforcement effect electronic surveillance" was warranted and had
precedent."' In the past carriers had been required to accommodate
law enforcement. Director Freeh went on to list examples of expenses
incurred by carriers to meet their obligations to law enforcement,
including maintaining phone toll records to be able to provide law
enforcement with subscriber information, a service that requires the
carrier to expend time, personnel, and money. Another expense to
carriers comes from legislation that requires carriers to provide
"interoperable equipment to assist the hearing-impaired" and to
regulate dial-a-porn. Further, "many localities require by law that the
telecommunication local exchange carriers provide 911 emergency
service, the cost of which is passed on to all subscribers. 1 72
In light of the government's precedent in requiring
telecommunications carriers to bear the burden of its regulations, and
because it is up to the Justice Department to determine reasonable
cost, carriers have expressed concern over what they will be expected
to finance themselves. After the FBI first made its requirements for
the ESI known to telecommunications carriers in April, 1996, the
industry estimated that the necessary technological upgrades to
support that request would cost $1.8 billion, well in excess of the half
billion dollars allotted for the task. 73 One carrier put the cost of
"retrofitting a large carrier's wireline business at between $138 and
$237 million." '174 The reaction to the FBI's second meeting to present
its demands for the ESI was also wary of the costs to the industry, one
of the members of the TIA wrote to the FBI that "its
recommendations reflected 'none of the concerns about cost ... that
Congress specifically identified as important considerations.' 175
Because of these concerns, privacy groups began to protest the
funding of CALEA before Congress. 176 The American Civil Liberties
Union targeted the appropriations process in Congress in an attempt
171. March Hearing, supra note 7 (statement of FBI Director Freeh).
172. Id.
173. Jim McGee, Heightened Tension Over Digital Taps; Telecommunications Industry,
FBI at Odds Over High-Tech Tools, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 1996, at Hi.
174. Eby, supra note 170, at 48. See also Freeh Commends Industry for Cooperation on
Wiretap Issues, 3 WASH. TELECOMM. NEWS, No. 19, May 15, 1995 (quoting the U.S.
Telephone Association estimating that the "cost to modify equipment will be more than $2
billion.").
175. Eby, supra note 170, at 48.
176. Kevin Power, Privacy Groups Shoot to Kill Wiretap Program Funding, 14 GOV'T
COMPUTER NEWS, No. 13, July 3,1995, at 57.
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to nullify a proposed $100 million fund that was to reimburse
carriers.1 77 Strong opposition to any funding of CALEA was led by
freshman Congressman Bob Barr of Georgia, whose efforts managed
to "kill[] each and every attempt by lawmakers over the past year-and-
a-half to appropriate monies for [the] program."'178 Congress had
initially appropriated funds to the FBI to begin implementation of
changes in digital capabilities, but then refused to allow the FBI to
disburse the funds until the FBI can explain more fully what
capabilities it wants, and what the capacity the industry will be
required to provide.179 However, anxious to finish up the legislative
session, Congress inserted a temporary "Telecommunications Carrier
Compliance Fund" into its year end omnibus appropriations bill.1
8 °
The provision was passed by the House only after Representative Barr
was able to insert an amendment requiring the FBI to apprise
Congress of any proposed expenditures and then wait sixty days while
Congress reviewed them before it could make any reimbursements.' 8'
The provision, which was inserted at the end of Public Law 103-414, as
a new title IV, provided that interested law enforcement agencies or
agencies with "intelligence responsibilities" could deposit unspent
budget allocations into this temporary fund to implement the goals of
CALEA.182
C. Technological Standards
1. The Conflict Over the Requirements of the Initial Notice
The release of the Initial Notice by the FBI in October 1995
created a "firestorm" of criticism because of its demand that the
telecommunications industry support "multipoint" wiretapping,
wherein up to one percent of the cell phones in a central switching
facility could be tapped simultaneously; a capacity equivalent of, "for
example, every pay phone in Grand Central station." 183 The primary
concern of the criticism was reflected in the headlines run in
newspapers around the country that blazed "FBI Wants Advanced
177. Id.
178. Jeffrey Silva, Clinton Uses Back Door to Try to Fund CALEA, RADIO COMM.
REPORT, July 15, 1996, at 1.
179. McGee, supra note 173, at HI.
180. Frezza, supra note 143, at 81.
181. Jeffrey Silva, Digital Wiretapping to Be Funded and Scrutinized Under New Bill,
RADIO COMM. REPORT, July 29, 1996, at 26.
182. 142 CONG. REC. H11644-01, H11650 (Sept. 28, 1996).
183. Frezza, supra note 143, at 81.
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System to Vastly Increase Wiretapping. '" 18 4 Due to a misinterpretation
of the term "engineered capacity," most readers felt that the 1%
maximum capacity requirement for Category I meant the FBI was
asking to tap one of every 100 phone lines; therefore in a city the size
of New York, with two million phone and data transmission lines, the
FBI was asking to simultaneously wiretap 20,000 of them.185
The FBI responded to the New York Times article with a press
release stating that it did not wish to expand its capabilities, it merely
wants to maintain the status quo. 186 The next day, major newspapers
across the country ran a correction, indicating that the FBI actually
only wanted to have the capability to tap one of every 1,000 phone
lines.187 The FBI wanted to be able to tap one of every 100 phone
calls. 188 As it is now, the FBI taps about a thousand phones a year. 89
According to an advocacy group, the Voters Telecommunication
Watch, although the FBI figures were initially misrepresented, one
should still be alarmed at what the FBI is asking. 190 The group states
that this still is an "absurdly large amount of simultaneous wiretaps in
a single area given that ... a total of 1,154 wiretap orders were issued
for the entire U.S. for all of 1994." 191 However, at the point that the
FBI issued its First Notice, it probably knew as little as anyone else
what its capacity requirements would ultimately be.192
184. John Markoff, FBI Wants Advanced System to Vastly Increase Wiretapping, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 1995, at Al. See also FBI's Digital Telephony Capacity Request Raises
Eyebrows and Protests, 5 ADVANCED INTELLIGENT NETWORK NEWS, No. 23, Nov. 15,
1995 (stating that AP reports were headlined "FBI Wants to Wiretap One of Every 100
Phones in Urban Areas,").
185. FBI Wants to Wiretap One of Every 100 Phones in Urban Areas, DOW JONES
NEWS SERVICE (Nov. 2, 1995).
186. Department of Justice Press Release, FBI, Letter to the Editor of the New York.
Times by Louis Freeh, Director of the FBI (Nov. 2, 1995).
187. S.F. CHRON., Nov. 3, 1995, at Corrections, A2.
188. Id.
189. Senator Pushes FBI on Mammoth Surveillance Request, NEWSBYTES, Nov. 13,
1995.
190. Id. The misinformation is from:
confusion over the term "engineered subscriber capacity." The FBI is not asking
for the ability to tap a stated percentage of the total traffic that can be carried on
it simultaneously. Thus in a hypothetical Category I area with 1 million
subscribers, the FBI is not asking for the ability to simultaneously tap 10,000
phones. "Assume that only half the subscribers can actually pick up their handsets
and make a call simultaneously. That cuts the actual number of simultaneous
required interceptions to 5,000."
Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. See also John Schwartz, FBI Lists Needs for Wiretaps, WASH. POST, Jan. 15,
1997, at A2. (Deputy FBI Director Kallstrom admitted after the release of the Second
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2. The Conflict Over the Requirements of the Second Notice
The release of the Second Notice and request for comments drew
"approving, if reserved, reactions from telecommunications
executives." '193 Using new formulas to determine required capacity,
the new figures would require, in a metropolitan area like New York,
a capacity that would enable law enforcement to monitor 1,484 phone
lines simultaneously.1 94 The FBI said it imagined it would only have
modest increases over the current rates of wiretaps, of around 1,000
wiretaps per year.195 David Sobel, of the Electronic Privacy
Information Center, said that the expected increases projected by the
FBI constituted "significant" growth in wiretaps over the next few
years.1 96
Though this plan will likely be less expensive than the previous
plan, "revamping the nation's telephone and wireless communications
systems to make it easier for the FBI to conduct surveillance on digital
networks may cost hundreds of millions of dollars-some of which will
be allocated by Congress, With the rest presumably coming from rates
paid by customers." 197 Though the Second Notice's deadline for
comments was February 13, 1997, that deadline was pushed out
another 30 days by the FBI.198 The extension was granted because the
telecommunications industry is again in a dispute with the FBI over its
proposed plans. According to figures released in the Second Notice,
the Cellular Telephone Industry Association determined that the
highest number for simultaneous cellular phone taps nationwide by
any law enforcement agency ever was 6,070.199 However, at a meeting
between the FBI and telecommunications representatives in early
February, the FBI proposed that law enforcement be given the ability
to monitor 103,190 calls simultaneously.2" Telecommunications
executives stated that "such surveillance capacity would cost hundreds
of millions of dollars, and they complain that the FBI is calling for
communications companies or their customers to pay the bill. '20 1
Notice that the approach the FBI used in its Initial Notice was "very imprecise").
193. Seth Schiesel, FBI Revises Proposal for Surveillance of Digital Communications,
FRESNO BEE, Jan. 15, 1997, at A6.
194. Id.
195. John Schwartz, FBI Lists Needs for Wiretaps, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1997, at A2.
196. Id.
197. Schiesel, supra note 193, at A4.
198. John Markoff, Dispute Arises Over FBI Wiretap Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1997,
at Al.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
19981
3. The Conflict Over the Requirements of the Final Notice
The Final Notice of capacity does not appear to be as
inflammatory as its precursors. Reference was made to the FBI
"quietly releas[ing] its long-awaited" Final Notice2 2 The lack of
fanfare and conflict, though yet early, seems to indicate a willingness
among members of the industry to accept the capacity requirements as
set out in the Final Notice. What is threatening to derail the
implementation of the plan is instead the expanded surveillance
capabilities the FBI has been demanding in its negotiations on
standards with the industry, the so-called "punch-list. 20 3 These
demands are set out previously in Part IV. The CDT has even
petitioned the FCC to intervene in order to protect privacy rights of
American citizens, citing its grave concerns over the "punch-list," and
other surveillance requirements requested by the FBI.2" Despite
these continuing differences in the interpretation of the requirements
of CALEA, the Justice department has indicated that it will still
enforce the October 25, 1998 compliance date, and would only allow
an extension of 18 months for carriers to come into compliance with
its additional wiretap requests (the punch-list). 205
V
Proposal
Until quite recently, law enforcement agencies could wiretap by
putting alligator clips onto the copper phone wires.206 Obviously, this
meant that the FBI knew the location of their suspect when that
suspect used a tapped phone. The Assistant FBI Director's assurances
that the FBI is not seeking any capabilities beyond what it has
previously enjoyed 207 are somewhat disingenuous. Because phones
202. CALEA Talks Break Down Again, Increasing Chances for Implementation
Extension, WIRELESS TODAY, Vol. 2, No. 54 (Mar. 19, 1998).
203. Id.
204. In the Matter of Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Petition
for Rulemaking under Sections 107 and 109 of the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECH. (Mar. 26, 1998)
<http://www.cdt.org./digi-tele/980426_fcc_calea.html#v>.
205. Jeffrey Silva, Justice Calls Wiretap Deficient, RADIO COMM. REPORT, Mar. 30,
1998, at 1.
206. Stewart Baker & Clint Smith, Saving the Endangered Wiretap; Industry's New
Obligations to Assist Law Enforcement Are Still Being Clarified, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 20,
1995, at S30.
207. Jube Shiver, Jr., Congressman Urges Inquiry of Wireless Tracking Plan;
Telecommunications: FBI Seeking Technology to Locate Cellular Phone Users, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 1996, at D2.
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were stationary, location was naturally part of the information
received. Now phones move, and the FBI still wants to know the
location of the phone they are tapping.
Though this is more than likely an issue that will be debated by
the courts if the FBI gets its way, the FBI should be prevented from
implementing its tracking plan.208 CALEA specifically provides that
no information regarding the specific location of the subscriber be
included under the scope of "call-identifying" information.2 9 It also
prohibits law enforcement from requiring that the
telecommunications industry specifically redesign their equipment
with wiretapping needs in mind.210 Yet the FBI "has argued that
CALEA requires cellular telephone companies to design into their
systems the capability to physically track cellular telephone users." 211
CALEA should be enforced against the FBI, and the FBI made to
comply with the applicable restrictions.
The deadline for compliance by telecommunications carriers is
fast approaching, and many unresolved issues are still being debated
by the industry and privacy rights advocates. 212 It is now too late to
208. Stop FBI's Intrusion, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Nov. 4, 1995, at A14
(arguing that in light of FBI related incident at Ruby Ridge, the FBI should be curtailed in
its ability to spy on citizens, because recent experience with the FBI teaches that "if you
give them an inch, they'll take a mile.").
209. CALEA provides:
Except that, with regard to information acquired solely pursuant to the authority
for pen registers and trap and trace devices .... such call-identifying information
shall not include any information that may disclose the physical location of the
subscriber (except to the extent that the location may be determined from the
telephone number).
Pub. L. No. 103-414, § 103(a)(2)(B) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2)(B)
(1995)).
210. CALEA explicitly states that:
This title does not authorize any law enforcement agency or officer-(A) to
require any specific design of equipment, facilities, services, features, or system
configurations to be adopted by any provider of a wire or electronic
communication service, any manufacturer of telecommunications equipment, or
any provider of telecommunications support services.
Pub. L. No. 103-414, § 103(b)(1) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(1)) (1995).
211. Cellular Telephone Privacy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on Commerce,
105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Jerry Berman, Executive Director of the Center for
Democracy and Technology) (Feb. 5, 1997), available in Fed. Doe. Clearing House, 1997
WL 46883.
212. See generally Comments on the FBI's Second CALEA Capacity Notice, CENTER
FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECH. (visited Feb. 18, 1997) <http://www.cdt.org/digi-tele/
970218_comments.html> (listing as unresolved issues: interpretations of the notice that
would "impose unjustifiably large capacity requirements," county by county requirements
for capacity, the FBI's overstatement of the "simultaneous" requirement, and "differences
withhold funding for CALEA since Congress has already begun to
provide such funds. In light of this, Congress needs to examine
whether it can extend the deadline for compliance in order to give the
FBI and the telecommunications industry time to work out the
conflicts between the requirements of CALEA and those promulgated
by the FBI.
VI
Conclusion
Law enforcement needs to be able to keep pace with the changing
technologies now available. With call-forwarding, voice-mail, pagers,
and a host of other services now made available to the public, law
enforcement agencies face a very real possibility that without
CALEA, their abilities to wiretap will be virtually non-existent. The
need is obvious. What is not obvious is whether the FBI needs to
enlarge its wiretapping capabilities beyond what it is currently legally
allowed. Despite the FBI's protests to the contrary, it is not
maintaining the spirit of CALEA. This position is detrimental to the
telecommunications industry (who will have to pay the excessive costs
of the FBI's plan), the customers of the telecommunications carriers
(who will eventually have- the costs passed on to them), and individual
citizens' privacy rights (which may become significantly curtailed if
the FBI has its way).
While Congress should ensure that the needs of law enforcement
to wiretap are met, Congress must also work to ensure that CALEA
will be implemented in such a way as to protect the privacy rights of
citizens, and to prevent private industry from bearing the burden of
implementing a plan that far exceeds what was intended by CALEA.
between call content interceptions and access to dialed number information.").
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